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Introduction
The United States Constitution includes a guarantee that the government will not become
involved with one’s ability to freely practice religion. The framers included within this document
a Free Exercise Clause and an Establishment Clause.1 The Free Exercise Clause protects “a
church’s right to decide matters of governance and internal organization,” while the Establishment
Clause forbids “excessive government entanglement with religion.”2 These clauses, known
together as the Religion Clauses, provide churches with a high degree of autonomy from
government interference. This includes its decisions regarding who shall serve as its leaders, now
known as the “ministerial exception.” Although this exception always existed, the United States
Supreme Court did not recognize it formally until its 2012 decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC.3

This case solidified the doctrine, making religious

employers immune to claims of employment discrimination by those who qualify as a minister.
The Hosanna-Tabor decision solidified the existence of the exception, but still left many with
questions regarding its scope, specifically who qualifies as a minister and thus is barred from
bringing claims of employment discrimination. Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in HosannaTabor4 provided some guidance on who qualifies as a minister under the exception, but the Court
did not announce a formal test. Without adopting a formal test, the Court leaves who qualifies as
a minister up to interpretation. The Court should adopt a bright-line test which focuses on the
intentions of the church and the totality of the circumstances surrounding the employee’s duties to

U.S. Const. Amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or the free exercise
thereof…”).
2
Petruska v Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 307 (3rd Cir. 2006).
3
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
4
Id. at 198 (Alito, J., concurring).
1

1

create a formal, easily applied test of who qualifies as a minister. Additionally, this exception
should apply to all claims, not just those claims rooted in discrimination law.
When researching the ministerial exception, it became clear that much confusion exists
between section 702 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the ministerial exception.
While these two doctrines set out similar protections for employees, there are differences in
application and scope.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in employment based on an
employee’s gender, sex, religion, race or national origin. The religious exception, in Section 702
of Title VII, protects employers from claims of religious discrimination when the claim relates to
a religious corporation, association, or society with respect to the employment of
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on
by such corporation, association, or society of its religious activities or to an
educational institution with respect to the employment of individuals to perform
work connected with the educational activities of such institution.5
This section thus allows religious employers to discriminatorily favor employees of their own
religion. Additionally, this protects religious employers from claims of religious discrimination
when those claims stem from employment within a religious institution and the job pertains to said
religious institution.6 This does not protect employers from any other claim of discrimination
under Title VII, such as race, gender, national origin or color.
The Religion Clauses protect the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of religion. Cases
that apply the ministerial exception bar the court’s interference with a decision made by religious
institutions when those decisions pertain to the upper-level of church employees or ambassadors

5

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Section 702; see also Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1986)
(holding that an employer is protected from claims of religious discrimination under Section 702).
6
See Id.; See also Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Section 702(a).
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because doing so would violate the church autonomy protections given by the First Amendment.7
This includes all types of discriminatory behavior, including the race, color, religion, or national
origin that Section 702 does not cover. This exception fills in the gaps left by Section 702 and
provides protection to religious institutions that discriminate against their ministers for both
religious and non-religious purposes.8
Part II of this paper will explain the difference between the constitutionally based ministerial
exception and the statutorily based exception under Section 702 of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Part III explains the pre-Hosanna-Tabor landscape and gives details regarding the
most relevant cases prior to the 2012 decision. Part IV explains the facts, holding and two
concurrences of the Hosanna-Tabor case, giving us clarity on the scope of the ministerial
exception for the first time and becoming the landmark case in this area. Part V explains how the
courts have applied the Hosanna-Tabor decision in discrimination cases since 2012. Finally, Part
VI explains the holes left by the Hosanna-Tabor decision, including possible solutions to the
problems left in the wake of this case.
I.

Development/History of the Ministerial Exception

a. Supreme Court Precedent: Development of the Church Autonomy Doctrine
The Constitution always guaranteed Americans that the government would not become
entangled with religion.9 This included that the government would not involve itself with a
religious entity’s decision to hire or fire its employees. Although the ministerial exception was

7

Laura L. Coon, Note, Employment Discrimination by Religious Institutions: Limiting the Sanctuary of the
Constitutional Ministerial Exception to Religion-Based Employment Decisions, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 481, 500 (2001).
8
Id.
9
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
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not formally recognized by the court until 2012,10 courts protected a church’s right to
autonomously make decisions for at least one-hundred-forty years prior.11
The First time the Court encountered a case that laid the foundation for the ministerial
exception occurred in Watson v. Jones.12 This case and its holding serves as a basis for the more
formal ministerial exception, which is not introduced until Serbian Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich in 1976.13 In Watson, “the Court considered a dispute between antislavery and
proslavery factions over who controlled the property of the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church.”14
When the Presbyterian Church built the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church, it decided to
incorporate the trustees of the church with the power to hold any real estate then owned by the
church.15 These trustees were to serve a two-year term before requiring re-election.16 The problem
in this case stemmed from a dispute over who had power to choose whether or not the church
would participate in slavery.17
Ultimately, the Court held that “whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or
ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of [the] church judicatories to
which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as
binding on them.”18 While this case did not involve a claim of employment discrimination, it
serves as the first time the Court recognized that a decision made by the highest level of internal
government of a church was not to be disturbed by civil government or legal system. Additionally,
the Court, for the first time, provided a scope of the Church Autonomy Doctrine, which laid the

10

Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1872).
12
Id.
13
426 U.S. 696 (1976).
14
Watson, 80 U.S. at 727
15
Id. at 679.
16
Id.
17
See Watson, 80 U.S. at 679.
18
See Id. at 727.
11
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foundation for the ministerial exception. The Court in Watson stated that for the Church Autonomy
Doctrine to apply, there must be (1) a “question of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule,
custom, or law” and (2) that question was “decided by the highest of [the] church judicatories.”19
Although this decision did not introduce the ministerial exception, these principles laid the
foundation for the Court’s later decisions that created the exception.
The Court next decided Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in
North America.20 After the Bolshevist Revolution of 1917 in Russia, a separatist movement
developed among members of the Russian Orthodox Church in the United States.21

This

movement eventually declared its autonomy from the mother church in Russia.22 As a way to free
the church in the United States from those atheistic and subversive influences of the mother church,
the New York Legislature passed a bill that required “all the churches formerly administratively
subject to the mother church in Russia be governed by the ecclesiastical body of the American
Separatist movement.”23
This action began over a dispute as to who should control a building that was used as a
church.24 The plaintiffs, a corporation that held the building in trust for the mother church in
Russia, challenged the defendants, appointees of the central Russian church authorities (appointed
by the American Separatist movement).25
The Court ultimately decided in favor of the plaintiffs.26 After first explaining that Watson27
was decided before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court noted that the Free

19

Id.
344 U.S. 94 (1952).
21
Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 95.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 96.
25
Id. at 96-97.
26
Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 121.
27
80 U.S. 679 (1872).
20
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Exercise and Establishment Clauses are incorporated into and made applicable to the states in order
to protect the people against acts of the state such as this bill.28 The Court also held that those who
controlled the building classified as clergy of the church and that “freedom to select the clergy,
where no improper methods of choice are proven,” falls under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.29 As such, the bill requiring all churches to be governed by the American Separatist
movement was deemed unconstitutional.30
These cases paved the way for the Court’s decision in Serbian Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich,31 which directly involved the relationship between a church and its minister. This
case involved the split of the American-Canadian Serbian Orthodox Diocese after a bishop was
defrocked for claims of misconduct.32 After finding out about the claims of misconduct, the
mother church made the decision to defrock the bishop.33 The bishop then sued the mother church,
requesting the Illinois State Courts to declare him the true diocesan bishop.34 The Illinois Supreme
Court obliged and ordered him reinstated.35
The United States Supreme Court found that deciding this dispute would violate the principles
of the First Amendment.36 The Court introduced, for the first time, the ministerial exception,
reinforcing Watson and Kedroff, stating “[T]he rule of action which should govern the civil courts
. . . is, that, whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law
have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried,
the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application

28

Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 115-16.
Id. at 120-21.
30
Id.
31
426 U.S. 696 (1976).
32
Id. at 698-99.
33
Id. at 705.
34
Id. at 706-07.
35
Id. at 708.
36
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 710.
29
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to the case before them.”37 The Court leaned on the fact that the mother church was the one who
made the ultimate decision about a high-ranking employee of the church in finding that it could
not decide the dispute.38
While the above cases all cemented the fact that a decision a religious institution makes
regarding its highest level of employees, or clergy, or ministers should be binding and free from
governmental review, none of these cases defined the protection afforded to these groups. No test
existed to decide if someone qualified as a clergy or minister, leading to the need for that
clarification in Hosanna-Tabor.
b. Lower Court Precedent
The lower courts recognized a ministerial exception for at least forty years prior to
Hosanna-Tabor.39 Beginning with the cases of McClure v. Salvation Army40 and Rayburn v.
General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists,41 the lower courts first used the term ministerial
exception and clarified the scope of the exception.
McClure involves a dispute between the church of the Salvation Army and one of its
ordained ministers, Mrs. Billie B. McClure.42 After undergoing a two-year training period by the
Salvation Army, Mrs. McClure was commissioned as an officer [minister] in June, 1967.43 After
Mrs. McClure was terminated from her officer position, she brought suit under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging the Salvation Army engaged in discriminatory practices based

37

Id.
Id. at 711-12 (“Because the appointment [to the chaplaincy] is a canonical act, it is the function of the church
authorities to determine what the essential qualifications of a chaplain are and whether the candidate possesses
them.”).
39
McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
40
460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
41
772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985).
42
McClure, 460 F.2d at 554.
43
Id. at 555.
38
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on her gender, and that she was retaliated against for complaining of these practices to her
superiors.44
The Fifth Circuit found that being an officer constituted being a minister, and as such, the
Free Exercise Clause barred the employment discrimination claim.45 “We find that the application
of the provisions of Title VII to the employment relationship existing between The Salvation Army
and Mrs. McClure, a church and its minister, would result in an encroachment by the State into an
area of religious freedom which it is forbidden to enter by the principles of the free exercise clause
of the First Amendment.”46

The Court clarified, however, that “’if a serious doubt of

constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute [Title VII] is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.’”47
This decision shows the Court’s reluctance to decide this issue, as it will avoid deciding cases
through the lens of Title VII if at all possible.
Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists presents the first time a court
formally calls the exception the “ministerial exception,” but does not go far enough to cement this
exception into law.48 The conflict in this case arises from a claim of racial and sex discrimination.49
Appellant Carole Rayburn is a white member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church.50 After
applying for a vacancy on the pastoral staff of the Sligo Seventh-day Adventist Church, she was
denied. Ms. Rayburn then filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
under Title VII alleging that she was not hired based on her sex, her association with black persons,

44

Id. at 555-56.
Id. at 560.
46
Id.
47
Id. citing Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 1936, 297 U.S. 288 (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Brandeis).
48
772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985).
49
Id.
50
Id. at 1165.
45
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her membership in black-oriented religious organizations and in retaliation of her filing a
complaint under Title VII.51 The federal district court dismissed the claim.
The Federal Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district
court, holding that “because state scrutiny of the church’s choice would infringe substantially on
the church’s free exercise of religion and would constitute impermissible government
entanglement with church authority,” the Court could not rule on the issue.52
While both of these cases solidified the existence of an exception, they lacked any guidance
on how the courts should apply the exception. Over the next forty years, every circuit adopted the
ministerial exception and there were numerous cases that attempted to apply the confusing
precedent surrounding the ministerial exception.53 The need for a distinct set of criteria led to the
case of Hosanna-Tabor in 2012.
II.

The Ministerial Exception Accepted: Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
& Sch. v. EEOC
a. Facts
This case stems from the decision of petitioner Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran

Church and School to terminate the employment of Respondent Cheryl Perich. Petitioner is a
member of the Lutheran Church – Missouri Synod.54 The school has two categories of teachers,
“called” and “lay.”55 “Called” teachers are those who have been called to their position by God
and require certain academic requirements, including a course of theological study.56 “Lay”

51

Id.
Id.
53
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188.
54
Id. at 171.
55
Id.
56
Id.
52
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teachers are not required to be trained by the Church.57 Once a teacher is “called,” they receive
the title of “Minister of Religion, Commissioned.”58
After respondent completed the required training, the school hired her as a “called”
teacher.59 In addition to teaching secular subjects, Ms. Perich “taught a religion class, led her
students in daily prayer and devotional exercises, and took her students to a weekly school-wide
chapel service,” which she led about twice a year.60
In 2004-2005, Ms. Perich was diagnosed with narcolepsy.61 She notified the school of her
condition in January 2005, stating that she would be able to return to work in February. 62 The
school informed her that they already contracted with a “lay” teacher to fill Ms. Perich’s position
and expressed doubts about her ability to return to the classroom.63 After Ms. Perich was not hired,
she threatened to assert her legal rights and sue the school for discrimination.64 After this, she was
told that she must use the internal decision-making process to complain, and was fired due to her
threat to sue.65
After being terminated for “insubordination and disruptive behavior,” Ms. Perich filed a
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, claiming that her termination
violated the Americans with Disabilities Act.66 The EEOC brought suit against the employers,
which Ms. Perich intervened in, alleging that Ms. Perich was terminated after threatening to file
an ADA law suit.67 Hosanna-Tabor invoked the “ministerial exception,” arguing that the First

57

Id.
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 171.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 171.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 171-72.
65
Id.
66
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 172.
67
Id.
58
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Amendment barred the suit because Ms. Perich was a minister.68 The District Court ruled in favor
of the school, granting summary judgment in favor of Hosanna-Tabor.69 The Sixth Circuit vacated
and remanded that decision, recognizing the existence of a ministerial exception but concluding
that Ms. Perich did not qualify as a “minister” under the exception. 70 Had the Court found that
Ms. Perich did qualify as a minister, her suit could have proceeded on other grouns as she could
have continued on disability grounds or on any other grounds where Title VII’s exemption for
religious discrimination does not apply.
b. Majority Opinion and Holding
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion in a 9-0 decision. After delving into a history of
the battle between church and state and how this history influenced the creation of the First
Amendment, Chief Justice Roberts briefly summarized the case law up to this point.71 After giving
a history of the Amendment and the creation of the doctrine of church autonomy, Chief Justice
Roberts recognized that the ministerial exception does exist, including in the decision, for the first
time, the name “ministerial exception.”72
Chief Justice Roberts then explains the reasoning for the exception. He writes that if the
Court were to get involved in a church decision to accept or reject a minister, the Court would be
interfering “with the internal governance of the Church.”73 This passage is similar to the earlierdiscussed cases of Watson, Kedroff and Serbian Orthodox in that it acknowledges the long history
of the Court respecting the autonomy of a church. The Court stated that “[b]y imposing an

68

Id.
EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106726, 8 (E.D. MI
2008).
70
EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F. 3d 769, 782 (6th Cir. 2010).
71
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 184-87 (summarizing the contents of Part III of this paper).
72
Id. (“We agree that there is such a ministerial exception.”).
73
Id. at 188.
69
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unwanted minister, the state infringed the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s
right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments.”74
The opinion then turns to the contentions of the parties. To begin, both sides contended
that employment discrimination laws would be unconstitutional if they infringed upon the right of
association.75 As such, the EEOC and Ms. Perich saw no need for the existence of the ministerial
exception.76 The EEOC and Ms. Perich acknowledged that the right of association granted in the
First Amendment serves to protect religious institutions from claims of discrimination in certain
circumstances, such as compelling an Orthodox Jewish seminary to ordain a woman. 77 Since an
established means of protecting these institutions from these types of claims of discrimination
already exists, Petitioners argued that there is no need to create a brand new doctrine.
The Court dismissed this argument, stating that the right of association is given to both
religious and secular groups and that the Court could not accept a view that the First Amendment’s
Religion Clauses do not speak to “a religious organization’s freedom to select its own ministers.”78
The Court then dismissed the argument that the decision in Smith79 precluded the
recognition of a ministerial exception. In that case, two members of the Native American Church
were fired from their jobs for ingesting peyote, a substance that was illegal under federal law.80
The Supreme Court held that this did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because “the ‘right of
free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral
law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his

74

Id.
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 189.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. V. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
80
Id. at 877.
75
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religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”81 Chief Justice Roberts makes clear that a church’s selection
of its ministers differs from ingesting peyote, as Hosanna-Tabor concerned government
interference with the internal decisions of a religious institution that affect the faith and mission of
that institution while Smith involved government regulation of an outward physical act.82
After dismissing the respondent’s arguments, Chief Justice Roberts set out to define the
scope of the exception, specifically who qualified as a minister.83 Chief Justice Roberts looked to
factors such as Ms. Perich’s title of minister, her specialized theological education, the fact that
Ms. Perich held herself out as a minister, and the scope of her job duties (“leading others toward
Christian maturity and teaching faithfully the Word of God”).84 Using these factors directly
opposed the Sixth Circuit’s determination that Ms. Perich was not a minister. The Court held that
the Sixth Circuit erred in leaning too heavily on the fact that Ms. Perich performed the same duties
as lay teachers and the Sixth Circuit placed too much emphasis on Ms. Perich’s performance of
secular duties.85 Based on these factors, the Court held that Ms. Perich did qualify as a minister,
and therefore, her claim of discrimination was barred.86 Although the Court looked to these factors
in this case, it did not offer any concrete or bright-line test as to if an employee qualifies as a
minister. Chief Justice Roberts also turns to a totality of the circumstances test, explicitly
restricting this holding to claims arising under anti-discrimination statutes, as opposed to other
types of claims, like breach of contract.87
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Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 877).
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190.
83
Id. at 191.
84
Id. at 191-92.
85
Id. at 174.
86
Id. at 192-94.
87
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 195-96.
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c. Justice Thomas’ Concurring Opinion
Although the Hosanna-Tabor case was a 9-0 decision, two Justices felt compelled to write
a separate concurring opinion. Justice Thomas authored the concurrence to clarify what he
believed the constitution meant by having a ministerial exception.88
Justice Thomas did not deliver a concrete test of who was a minister; however, he did
propose a method of determining this. In the concurrence, he writes “in my view, the Religion
Clauses require civil courts to apply the ministerial exception and to defer to a religious
organization’s good-faith understanding of who qualifies as its minister.”89 Justice Thomas felt
that the differing leadership structures present in the many religions the people of this nation
practice presented problems when a secular court attempted to interpret who should qualify as a
minister.90 Justice Thomas feared a “bright-line” test of who qualifies as a minister because he
felt that this sort of test would disadvantage those groups whose beliefs fell outside the scope of
the “mainstream” religions.91 Additionally, Justice Thomas feared that creating a concrete test
would cause these religions to curtail their beliefs and leadership structures to ensure that their
way of choosing ministers would conform with the test.92 At the conclusion of his concurrence,
Justice Thomas wrote that while the Court thoroughly set out the facts that made Cheryl Perich a
minister, the main reason for this qualification was that “Hosanna-Tabor sincerely considered
Perich a minister.”93

88

Id. at 196 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 196.
90
Id. at 197.
91
Ibid.
92
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 197.
93
Id. at 197-98.
89
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d. Justice Alito’s Concurring Opinion
The second concurrence in this case was authored by Justice Alito, with whom Justice
Kagan joined.94 Through this concurrence, Justice Alito attempts to outline the scope of the
ministerial exception by proposing an informal test to determine if Perich was a minister.
After discussing the history of the exception in both the Constitution and in lower courts’
case law, Justice Alito turns to the facts of the case. He rests his decision that Perich was a minister
on four main questions, which many have called the “religious functions test,” asking: 1) whether
Perich played a substantial role in “conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its mission;”
2) how often Perich taught the children religion; 3) whether she led the students in daily devotional
exercises and prayers; and 4) the frequency that she led church-wide worship services.95 While
Justice Alito does not provide any specifics on how much time must be devoted to these activities,
prong two, three and four all point to the intensity and frequency of the work. Additionally, the
substance of each prong involves conveying, teaching, transmitting or carrying out religious
messages, missions, or ceremonial practices. These four categories are the first time that the Court
has introduced any sort of “bright-line” test. However, he does not describe which factors, if any,
are the most important.
Justice Alito fails to describe the limits to which one’s duties could be considered to satisfy
a prong. For example, Justice Alito does not describe if leading worship services once a year
satisfactorily satisfies the fourth prong. Interestingly, Justice Alito ends his concurrence similar
to the way Justice Thomas concluded, stating that what truly matters is that the religious entity
considered Perich a minister.96

94

Id. at 198 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 205.
96
Id. at 206.
95
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III.

Application of the decision in Hosanna-Tabor

Although only seven years have passed since the decision in Hosanna-Tabor, there are ample
examples of the lower courts interpreting and applying the Supreme Court’s decision. However,
these courts seem to have differing opinions on how to apply the decision, although most courts
emphasize similar parts of the Court’s decision when deciding whether one qualifies as a
minister.97 While the decision of the Supreme Court seemed to focus on if the person in question
was engaged in the ministry of the organization, the lower courts seem to focus more on the
individual activities described in Justice Alito’s concurrence.98
The first of these comes in the decision in Cannata v. Catholic Dioscese of Austin.99 In that
case, Cannata became the Music Director at St. John Neumann Catholic Church.100 “In this
position, Cannata oversaw the Music Department’s budget and expenditures, managed the sound
systems at the church and maintained the sound equipment, music room, and music area in the
sanctuary, and rehearsed with members of the choir and cantors and accompanied them on the
piano during services while running the soundboard.”101 All of the liturgical responsibilities of
Cannata’s predecessor were given to another employee because Cannata lacked the requisite
education, training, and experience.102
After Cannata was fired in August 2007, he brought suit against the church alleging that his
termination was in violation of the ADEA and the ADA.103 The district court eventually granted

97

Brian M. Murray, A Tale of Two Inquiries: The Ministerial Exception After Hosanna-Tabor, 68 SMU L. Rev.
1123, 1123 (2015).
98
Id.
99
700 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that the previous three-part test used by the Court to determine if one
qualifies for the ministerial exception could no longer be used due to Hosanna-Tabor).
100
Id. at 170
101
Id. at 171.
102
Id.
103
Cannata, 700 F.3d at 171.
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a motion to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the application of the
ministerial exception.104
Prior to the Hosanna-Tabor decision, the Fifth Circuit applied a three-factor test for
determining when an employee qualifies as a minister.105
First, this court must consider whether employment decisions regarding the
position at issue are made largely on religious criteria[.] . . . Second, to constitute a
minister for purposes of the “ministerial exception,” the court must consider
whether the plaintiff was qualified and authorized to perform the ceremonies of the
Church . . . Third, and probably most important, is whether [the employee] engaged
in activities traditionally considered ecclesiastical or religious, including whether
the plaintiff attends to the religious needs of the faithful.106

After consulting with a professor of Constitutional Law, the Fifth Circuit formally invalidated
this three-part test, deferring to the totality of the circumstances articulated in Hosanna-Tabor.107
The Court acknowledged that a “bright-line” test would better help the lower courts in their
application of the Hosanna-Tabor decision, however, the clear rejection of a bright-line test in that
decision shows that lower courts should look to the totality of the circumstances so as to not
discriminate against any one religion.108 The Fifth Circuit ultimately affirmed the dismissal of
Cannata’s case, holding that because music was a central part of the religious ceremonies of the
church, and those musical performances were led by Cannata, that Cannata did qualify as a
minister, barring his discrimination claims.109
This decision becomes increasingly relevant as many religious educational institutions are
moving to include language in their handbooks which specify that all teachers, regardless of the

104

The district court decided this case prior to the Hosanna-Tabor decision. However, the Fifth Circuit decided the
appeal after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hosanna-Tabor.
105
Cannata, 700 F.3d at 175.
106
Id. at 175-76.
107
Id. at 176.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 180.

17

subjects taught, qualify as ministers. This trend began in 2015 when bishops in California, Hawaii
and Ohio required all teachers to know and adhere to Catholic teaching. 110 This move by the
Church leadership is spurring controversy, as the teacher unions fear that by allowing the church
to require this of teachers the church will gain too much power in collective bargaining. 111 The
church, on the other hand, defends the practice by explaining that these teachers are meant to be
moral role-models for the students, intended “not only by word, but by example, . . . to be models
to their students of ‘the ideal Person,’ Jesus Christ.”112
In addition to the attempt by the archdioceses to take control over this issue, the Supreme
Court has the opportunity to re-examine the issue. Petitions for a writ of certiorari have been filed
in the Supreme Court asking for a decision on whether a teacher with religious functions in a
religiously grounded school can be a minister if they have no formal religious training or
education.113 Two of these cases are from the Ninth Circuit and one is from the California Court
of Appeals.114
Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York, out of the Second Circuit, further exemplifies the
views of Hosanna-Tabor, except in that case, the court formulates the totality of the circumstances
view in a four-part test.115 In this case, Fratello served as principal of St. Anthony’s School, a
Roman catholic educational institution.116 After her contract was not renewed by the school,
Fratello sued alleging gender discrimination.117
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The Second Circuit looked to Hosanna-Tabor for guidance after St. Anthony’s attempted
to use the ministerial exception to bar the claim, leaning heavily on Justice Alito’s concurrence.
The Court originally examined the claim using the four factors set out in the majority opinion of
Hosanna: “1) the formal title given [to the teacher-plaintiff] by the Church, 2) the substance
reflected in that title, 3) her own use of that title, and 4) the important religious functions she
performed for the church.”118 The Second Circuit pointed to Justice Alito’s concurrence when it
stated that “a formal title indicating that the plaintiff is playing a religious role, though often
relevant, ‘is neither necessary nor sufficient.’”119 As such, the Second Circuit, again agreeing with
Justice Alito, held that courts should focus primarily on the functions the employee performed.120
The Court ultimately held that although Fratello’s title was not inherently religious, the facts
presented made it clear that she held herself out as a spiritual leader and performed many important
religious functions that advanced the Roman-Catholic mission of the school.121 As such, the Court
affirmed the district court’s application of the ministerial exception and grant of a motion to
dismiss.122
Although much case law exists after the Hosanna-Tabor decision, there is no uniformity
among the lower courts. Different circuits adopt different tests, stressing different duties in their
determination of who qualifies as a minister. This confusion of which test to adopt is evident in
Biel v. St. James School.123 In this case, Biel, a fifth-grade teacher, was fired after taking time off
due to a breast cancer diagnosis. The Ninth Circuit applied the factors from Hosanna-Tabor and
held that Ms. Biel’s claim was not barred by the ministerial exception. 124 The Ninth Circuit
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reached this decision because (1) Biel’s bachelor degree was not of a religious nature, (2) her
position came with no religious requirements, such as teaching a religion class, (3) the school did
not hold her out as a minister, and (4) her job was not analogous to that of Ms. Perich in HosannaTabor.125 The Court found that due to these factors, Ms. Biel was not a minister, and her claim
was not barred by the ministerial exception.126
Another example of lower courts not knowing which test should be applied comes from
the case of Sterlinski v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago127, decided less than a year after Biel. The
Catholic Bishop of Chicago originally hired Mr. Sterlinski in 1992 as Director of Music.128
However, in 2014, Mr. Sterlinski was demoted to organist before ultimately being fired in 2015.129
Mr. Sterlinski sued the Catholic Bishop alleging that his Polish heritage served as the ultimate
factor in his termination.130
The case hinged on whether the ministerial exception applied to Mr. Sterlinski. If the Court
were to find that Mr. Sterlinski qualified as a minister, his suit would not be able to proceed. Mr.
Sterlinski argues that because he “robotically” played the music given to him, he could not qualify
as a minister under the factors the Court used in Hosanna-Tabor.131
The Seventh Circuit upheld the decision of the Northern District of Illinois that an organist
does qualify as a minister under the rationale of Hosanna-Tabor, holding that Mr. Sterlinski’s
claims fell outside the protections afforded to employees under Title VII.132 The Seventh Circuit
came to this holding even though the facts of this case were less analogous to Hosanna-Tabor than
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those present in Biel, such as the fact that Mr. Sterlinski was not ordained and he did not serve as
a spiritual teacher to the students.133 Although both cases are very similar and the duties of both
employees would seem to not qualify as ministerial, the two circuits adopted different tests and
rationale for deciding two similar cases differently. The Supreme Court will have this opportunity
through these two cases, as both cases are relied on heavily in the petition for certiorari in the case
of Our Lady of Guadalupe.134
Since the Supreme Court decided not to adopt a rigid test, the lower courts are taking every
opportunity to formulate their own test. The lack of a uniform test allows the lower courts to create
factors not mentioned in the Hosanna decision, as well as to stress factors that the Court did not
make dispositive in that case. This confusion of which test to apply becomes highlighted when
analyzing the Biel and Sterlinski decisions. In Biel, the court adopts the factors that Justice Alito
proposed in his Hosanna-Tabor concurrence, while the Sterlinski court chooses to ignore these
factors in favor of a more inclusive view of who qualifies as a minister. Without uniformity among
the circuits, there is no protection for religious employers, and the Court can impermissibly
entangle itself with the internal governance of religious organizations. Not only will a uniform
test clarify the scope of the ministerial exception, it will detract from the numerous instances of
overly-burdensome litigation that often come with these cases.
IV.

The Problem with Contracts

One of the many problems with the ministerial exception is the question of whether the
exception should apply to claims of a breach of an employment contract, or whether the exception
should be limited to claims of employment discrimination. Currently, the Supreme Court holds
that the ministerial exception does not apply to claims of breach of an employment contract, and
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as such, an employee that qualifies as a minister can still bring suit against their employer if they
can show that the terms of their contract was validated.
Before the Hosanna-Tabor decision, Courts generally dispensed with the argument that the
ministerial exception should protect employers. Prior to 2012, courts generally held that contract
disputes between religious employers and their employees could not be adjudicated under the First
Amendment’s religion clauses.
The Courts continually found that limiting a religious employer’s ability to hire or fire
employees was a per se violation of the First Amendment.135 This can be seen in the case of Music
v. United Methodist Church.136 There, an employee of a religious entity filed suit after being fired
arguing that a contractual relationship existed between himself and the employer.137 The Kentucky
Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal’s grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.138 In doing so, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that deciding whether a contractual
relationship existed would require interpretation of church-made laws, something that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit a court from doing.139
The decision in Hosanna-Tabor created some confusion among the lower courts on this issue.
It explicitly applied only to anti-discrimination statutes and not to contract disputes. However,
after Hosanna-Tabor, some courts continued to protect churches in contract disputes. For instance,
in Debruin v. St. Patrick Congregation, the Wisconsin Supreme Court again found that an
employee’s claim of breach of an employment contract would force the Court to violate the First
Amendment, thus making the ministerial exception applicable to these types of cases.140 After
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Debruin entered into a one-year employment contract with St. Patrick Church (a Catholic Church
in the Archdiocese of Michigan) his employment was terminated, seemingly in violation of the
contract.141 The Court found that analyzing these claims, which would require deciding why a
religious institution hired or fired a ministerial employee, would violate the First Amendment.142
By holding this, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin applied the protections afforded to religious
institutions accused of discrimination under the ministerial exception to claims of a breach of
contract. This decision further highlights the confusion that comes with the Supreme Court’s
decision not to include a bright-line test as to when or to whom the exception applies.
In contrast of the Debruin decision, the Kentucky Supreme Court decided Kant v. Lexington
Theological Seminary in 2014.143 After Kant was terminated by the seminary, he filed suit alleging
that the termination violated his employment contract.144 Adopting the decision in HosannaTabor, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the ministerial exception did not bar Kant’s claims,
but even if it did, Kant did not qualify as a minister.145 This decision is contrary to the decision in
Debruin, further outlining the problems and inconsistencies lower courts have with applying the
“totality of the circumstances” test introduced by Hosanna-Tabor.
Failing to formally adopt the ministerial exception to contract disputes raises other issues as
well. For example, if the ministerial exception does apply to contract disputes the same as it does
employment discrimination claims, employees will not benefit from the signing of a contract. If
this exception applies, the religious employer would be free to violate any employment contract it
wished. As long as the employer could prove that the employee was a minister, which, under the
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confusing landscape currently adopted following Hosanna-Tabor, is not a difficult burden, the
employee would not be able to bring a claim to settle a contractual dispute.
V.

Analysis and Conclusions

It is obvious that the Hosanna-Tabor decision has created confusion among the lower courts.
This confusion is displayed through inconsistent applications and differing analyses used by the
lower courts when deciding these types of cases. Until the Supreme Court creates a bright-line
test as to when and to whom the ministerial exception applies, this confusion will remain.
The current “totality of the circumstances” test serves as a good starting point, but a further
test is needed. This test should look similar to that proposed in the concurrence by Justice Alito
(joined by Justice Kagan). There, Justice Alito proposed the “religious functions test,” asking: (1)
whether Perich played a substantial role in “conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its
mission;” 2) how often Perich taught the children religion; 3) whether she led the students in daily
devotional exercises and prayers; and 4) the frequency that she led church-wide worship services)
should serve as the reasoning for finding Perich to be a minister. 146 By incorporating these four
categories, Justice Alito created a valid bright-line test. However, he failed to make them more
generally applicable or define their scope.
Following the logic that Justice Alito used, the Supreme Court should adopt a “balancing test”
using the following four factors to determine when one qualifies as a minister: 1) whether the
employee played a substantial role in furthering the employer’s religious message; 2) how often
the employee engages in tasks relating to the religious mission of the employer; 3) whether the
employee held themselves out to be a minister; and 4) whether the employer considered the
employee to be a minister. In order to determine whether the employer considered the employee
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to be a minister, the Court could use a “parallel position” test. This would ask how a traditional
clergy member was treated and analyze how similarly the employee in question was treated.147
For example, in the Catholic faith, the Court would look to if the employee led weekly religious
services or if the employee ever offered teachings based on scripture.
Unlike Justice Alito’s concurrence, the Court should stress that although not determinative, the
third and fourth factor are the most important. Since the ministerial exception is rooted in the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses and aims to avoid the courts getting too involved in the
decisions of the church, the two most important questions to ask would be if the church considered
an employee to be in a leadership role, and whether the employee themselves thought of
themselves to be in that role.
There is concern over the issues that come with weighing the church’s view of their employees
so heavily. For example, if the church wanted to avoid all discrimination suits, it could simply
hold all employees as ministers. While this is a legitimate concern, especially when archdioceses
are beginning to amend their handbooks to make all teachers ministers,148 the importance of the
other factors, specifically the employee’s own thoughts, balances the test. Where the Church and
the employee both believe that the employee is a minister, there can be no doubt that employee
should be a minister. However, when there is disagreement about this between the employer and
employee, then the “totality of the circumstances” as described in Hosanna-Tabor (and in prongs
1 and 2 of my proposed “balancing test”) become helpful. These prongs focus on the daily duties
of the employee as they relate to the church’s religious purpose. Where an employee spends most
of their day contributing to the spread of the message of the religious, they should be considered a
minister.
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In addition to adopting this test, the Supreme Court should adopt a ruling which states that this
exception applies to all claims, regardless of whether the claim is based in contract or
discrimination law. The purpose of the exception was to keep the Courts from having to get
involved with the hiring or firing of an employee. This should not change based on which body
of law the employee bases their claim in. Regardless of discrimination or contract, the religious
institution should hold the power to decide who will be responsible for furthering their religious
message. The Supreme Court’s revised test should be applicable to all claims.
There is obvious concern that adopting a bright-line test will disadvantage non-traditional
religions. However, the proposed test is sufficiently general to include all religions, regardless of
conventionality. By focusing on how the religious institution and the employee themselves view
the role of the employee, the Supreme Court would allow for analyzing a non-traditional religion.
The test does not force the Court to look to if the employee performed the conventional tasks of a
minister, such as leading religious services or teaching religious classes. Instead, the proposed test
allows for a case-by-case analysis, where both sides view of the employee’s duties hold weight.
This test merges the tests proposed by Justice Thomas and Alito and allows for every relevant
factor to be examined, without favoring the view of one party over the other.
By adopting a bright-line test that stresses how the employer and employee viewed the role of
the employee, the Supreme Court will create uniformity among application by the lower courts.
No longer will there be differing opinions of who qualifies as a minister based solely off a lower
court’s reading of a case. The opportunity to create factors not mentioned in the Hosanna decision
or to lean heavily on a factor not meant to be dispositive will no longer exist for the lower courts.
Instead, each jurisdiction in the country will uniformly adopt and apply a single test. In addition
to the consistency of lower court decisions, this would allow employers to know who qualifies as
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a minister. By doing this, the Supreme Court would allow the religious institutions to focus on
spreading their message without guessing as to whether a hiring or firing decision will drag them
into the perils of litigation.
Given that the Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari to Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch.
v. Morrissey-Berru149, the answer to the issues raised in this article likely will be answered sooner
rather than later.
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